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Abstract
For Glendoe hydro-electric scheme in Scotland, the tunnelling contract was design–build. After a year, the tunnel collapsed, 
blocking a 71-m length, which necessitated construction of a by-pass tunnel. The responsibility for the collapse was exam-
ined in court and the findings were later appealed by a further three judges. The judge of the first case found that the cause 
of the failure was “erodible rock” and the other three judges agreed, but, it is argued, that there is evidence for a complex 
wedge failure at a scale larger than the geological mapping. It is considered that the Owner of the tunnel, Scottish Southern 
Electricity took on the risk by agreeing to a TBM-constructed, mostly unlined tunnel rather than a drill and blasted, fully 
lined tunnel as had been postulated at tender. The Contractor, Hochtief, constructed the tunnel and lined it in accordance 
with a Rock Excavation Classification design sheet that was agreed by all parties and approved by the Engineer. A clause, 
‘Option M’ limited the responsibility of the Contractor “for defects in the works due to his design so far as he proves that he 
used reasonable skill and care to ensure that it complied with the works information”. The question is posed as to whether or 
not the current judicial process may be an impediment to valid decision-making on responsibility for dealing with complex 
geotechnical problems. This paper suggests that these issues require a technical assessment and engineering judgement deci-
sion, rather than a legal opinion, adjudicated on the basis of opined contractual responsibility. Perhaps, an erudite technical 
panel deliberation rather than a judicial process should be given the final authority in such cases.
Keywords Geotechnical risk · Tunnels · Failure · Joints · Faults · Arbitration · Court
1 Introduction
There is always risk in carrying out engineering works 
below ground because of geological variability, the difficul-
ties in producing a representative model and problems with 
deciding on parameters. Geotechnical risk is dealt with con-
tractually in ‘design-bid-build’ contracts by various meth-
ods, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The Engineer, working directly 
for the Owner/Client, designs the works and instructs the 
Contractor whose tender is successful, on how to proceed. 
For simple sites, all risks might be taken by the Owner. 
Alternatively, where little is known about the conditions to 
be encountered, all ground risk might be accepted by the 
Contractor. Contractual alternatives include sharing the risk 
somehow. This is often done by incorporating ‘Clause 12’ 
conditions of the ICE Conditions of Contract, 7th Edition, 
which allows for physical conditions that could not have 
been foreseen by an experienced contractor to be paid for.
Where the Engineer and Contractor disagree over the 
interpretation of the Engineer, this may lead to litigation, 
wherein the nature and amount of ground investigation, that 
was instructed by the Engineer, may turn out to be a factor.
A second type of contract, as used at Glendoe, is 
‘design–build’. The Owner/Client may be advised separately 
by a consulting engineer (in the Glendoe case, by Jacobs), 
who conducts a partial site investigation and prepares a pre-
liminary design for the envisaged works. That preliminary 
design of the works is then let for tender, examined by vari-
ous contractors during the tendering phase, one of whom 
will be later contracted to carry out further site investigation 
(possibly) and the final design of the works. He will then 
construct the works, to be supervised and approved by a 
consulting engineer advising the Owner/Client.
The risk of unexpected ground conditions still exists 
under design–build contracts, but the common law position 
is that the risk of unforeseen ground conditions rests with 
the Contractor. An area where geotechnical risk can become 
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dominant in that form of contract is regarding the quality of 
the final works and the approvals thereof.
For the Glendoe hydro-electricity project, which will 
be discussed in detail later, the headrace tunnel was origi-
nally designed by the Owner’s engineer, Jacobs, to be con-
structed by drill and blast and to be fully lined (Carloway 
2018, para 22). The Owner, Scottish Southern Electricity 
Generation limited (‘SSE’) was persuaded during tender 
by Pöyry Energy JV (‘Pöyry’), Hochtief Solutions AG 
(‘Hochtief’), the tendering contractor’s design engineer, 
to accept a TBM-constructed tunnel which should result 
in a much smoother finish with less over-break. Pöyry 
predicted that the lining requirement could be reduced 
to 40% for a TBM-constructed tunnel, compared to the 
100% anticipated for a tunnel constructed by drill and 
blast (Carloway 2018, para 23). In the event, the project 
was accepted and then constructed by Hochtief taking 
decisions on lining requirements “at the face, based on 
actual conditions” (Woolman 2016, para 38) with, in the 
event, less than 1% of the headrace tunnel being fully 
lined (Woolman 2016, para 67). The tunnel was finished 
and inspected “on a metre-by-metre basis in 2008” by 
Hochtief, Pöyry, Jacobs and SSE which “only uncovered 
several minor issues which were resolved before water-
ing up” (Woolman 2016, para 181). The construction of 
the tunnel was approved [by Jacob’s approval of the ‘rock 
excavation sheets’ (‘REC’) on behalf of SSE, according 
to Woolman 2016, para 185] albeit that there remained a 
‘defects period’ for 2 years after take-over. The contractor 
avoided the consequence of ‘a defect that existed at takeo-
ver’ through ‘Option M’ of the contract, which excluded 
“liability for defects due to the contractor’s design if he 
proved that he used reasonable skill and care that his 
design complied with the ‘works information’” (Carloway 
2018, para 5). It seems evident that the close inspections 
by all parties following construction established the case 
of reasonable care, and the formal approval of the RECs 
by Jacobs showed that the contractor took account of the 
‘works information’ adequately.
The system was ‘watered up’ and then, over an 8-month 
period, a 71-m length of tunnel collapsed and became 
blocked. This led to a dispute which was initially referred 
to an adjudicator, Robert Galbraith QC, appointed by 
both parties, for a decision. He held that “there was no 
defect which existed at take-over since the rock support 
specified and installed was appropriate for the purposes 
of the contractual terms”. He concluded that “the damage 
which occurred after the works had been taken over was 
an employer’s risk” (Carloway 2018, para 51).
If the decision of adjudication is not accepted by the 
parties, as was clearly the case at Glendoe, then the final 
step might be resolution via an arbitration (the results from 
which would remain private to the parties). As an alterna-
tive to arbitration, the matter may be litigated in court, 
as for the Glendoe headrace tunnel. The disadvantage of 
a court process is that the facts may be assessed by non-
technically qualified judges on the basis of legal issues 
rather than by a technically qualified, independent, pro-
fessional engineer based on geotechnical matters (Winter 
2000). Furthermore, the results are not held ‘private and 
confidential’, there is every chance of an appeal, and all 
the ‘opinions’ are made available for public consumption 
as court records. Before examining the Glendoe evidence 
and the decision-making, there is a need to address the 
concept of geotechnical risk, because it is not simple.
Fig. 1  Options for addressing 
the risk of unexpected ground 
conditions in a design–bid–
build contract (after Hencher 
2012)
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2  Geotechnical Risk
Geotechnical risk can be very difficult to identify, depend-
ing on the geological conditions and the nature of the 
works. Complex geology does not automatically lead to 
geotechnical risk (Morgenstern and Cruden 1977) and, 
conversely, apparently simple ground conditions can cause 
problems if crucial factors are overlooked (Hencher 2012, 
Chapter 7). Note that in the following text, the term ‘risk’ 
is equated to ‘hazard’, whereas strictly, risk is assessed 
as probability of hazard occurrence multiplied by the 
consequence.
Baecher and Christian (2003) split the sources of geo-
technical ‘risk’ into three categories:
1. Natural variability (aleatory)
2. Knowledge uncertainty (epistemic)
3. Decision model uncertainty
The first two are interlinked—natural variability relates 
to the ground itself which might, for example, be a simple 
series of beds, strengthening with depth. Conversely, the 
ground might comprise a severely weathered and vari-
able profile or an intensely structurally folded and faulted 
geology, as is the case for the Glendoe headrace tunnel. 
Knowledge uncertainty can be reduced by increasing the 
amount of geotechnical investigation. Doubling or tripling 
the number of boreholes should help to reduce this risk 
but would not remove it completely. Baecher and Chris-
tian suggest that the first two sources of risk, natural and 
knowledge uncertainty, need to be dealt with by statistical 
methods although there are different viewpoints. Expert 
geological modelling, which aids the knowledge of vari-
ability within a causative model can be useful (Fookes 
1997). The Decision Model by definition must be based 
on quantified assessment of the first two, judging the vari-
ability and information available, and deciding on how to 
proceed.
Where one has 100% rock exposure in the walls of a tun-
nel, with a very high potential percentage of knowledge of 
the natural variability in essentially two dimensions, as at 
Glendoe, and experts who have examined the exposed rock 
judge the risk to be low, then is the risk low? And later, 
when the tunnel collapses, where does the responsibility for 
the evident risk that was inherently present (though invisible 
to the expert’s eyes) but which developed at a later stage, 
fall? Is it the expert’s fault (whose understanding of the 
problem or appreciation of true conditions might have been 
lacking) or the risk of the Owner, who agreed the criteria for 
acceptance of the tunnel? I will illustrate this dilemma with 
two examples followed by detailed discussion of the case of 
the tunnel collapse at Glendoe.
2.1  Example Case 1—Ilkley Moor Quarry
MSc students in Engineering Geology at the University of 
Leeds are trained in logging rock discontinuities and exam-
ining the potential for slope failure on these discontinuities 
during an annual university field class. This field class was 
conducted for several years in the Cow and Calf Quarry, at 
Ilkley Moor, Yorkshire, UK (Fig. 2). Students would be split 
into groups to conduct line surveys of discontinuities along 
the base of the quarry, and at higher levels as access allowed. 
After a few years of conducting surveys at the quarry, it 
was decided, because of the lack of geotechnical interest or 
features to describe, to move the exercise to another, larger 
quarry on the moor, where there are more joints and faults to 
be examined. The walk to the new location took the students 
past and above the previous quarry. Imagine the surprise 
when, a couple of years later, it was noted that a large corner 
section of the previous quarry field-class location had col-
lapsed (Fig. 3). The failure had occurred on a combination 
of steeply dipping joints that were probably not daylighting 
in the quarry and probably involved some local intact failure 
of the partially weathered rock. The students were called 
together and warned to remember this case as evidence that 
no one, not even a cohort of supervised MSc students con-
ducting a survey to predict slope failure, is infallible in spot-
ting a serious geotechnical hazard. 
2.2  Example Case 2—The Chinese University Slope, 
Hong Kong
Halcrow consulting engineers were commissioned to assess 
the need for and to design preventative measures to prevent 
rock fall or larger-scale failure at a series of slopes that were 
cut along various public roads in Hong Kong at the Chi-
nese University. A query was raised by the Client regarding 
the preventive measures that were being proposed, which 
largely comprised pattern rock dowelling and netting. It was 
Fig. 2  The Cow and Calf Quarry, Ilkley, West Yorkshire, UK
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considered by one of the Client’s advisors that the measures 
proposed by Halcrow were excessive. A visit was made to 
the site by a Halcrow director with other geotechnical engi-
neers to examine the rock in detail. It was observed that 
there were slabs of steeply dipping rock, many of which 
were undercut and some showing some degree of opening. 
That condition, combined with the knowledge of a history 
of rock falls at the site, led to the conclusion that the pro-
posed measures by the engineers were essentially correct 
and appropriate (Figs. 4, 5). The Client disagreed on the 
basis of advice from a separate consultant, and proceeded 
to terminate the Halcrow contract, opting for some reduced 
measures; it is unknown what works were actually carried 
out to the slopes. This simply illustrates that geotechnical 
opinions may differ about situations, and that the Client can 
adopt a riskier path, if he so chooses, and is so advised.
3  The Glendoe Headrace Tunnel
The Glendoe headrace tunnel is part of the works associated 
with the construction of a 100 MW hydroelectric scheme, 
owned by Scottish and Southern Energy plc (SSE) in the 
Monadhliath Mountains in Scotland. The £145 million tun-
nel was constructed by Hochtief Construction AG Major 
European Projects (Hochtief), together with its UK tun-
nelling subsidiaries. It was the first such tunnel to be con-
structed in Scotland since 1957.
A collapse occurred after the tunnel’s completion and 
handover to the Owner and the subsequent case is inter-
esting as it illustrates the problems of courts dealing with 
Fig. 3  Unexpected failure in the corner of the Cow and Calf Quarry
Fig. 4  The Chinese University rock cut slopes, Hong Kong
Fig. 5  Undercut blocks sitting on steeply dipping planes
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geotechnical terminology; furthermore, the case is reported 
in the public domain, so the findings can be examined and 
reviewed.
The main sources of information that have been used in 
developing this case record are the opinion of the outer house 
(Woolman 2016) and those of the first division, inner house 
(appeal) (Carloway 2018; Menzies 2018; Glennie 2018). 
There has been no access to the numerous expert reports 
produced for the trial for the plaintiff SSE (the “Pursuer”) or 
for the Defendant, Hochtief. Quotations from the experts are 
taken from Woolman’s opinion (2016) without identifying 
their Clients. This is deliberate, as the duty of experts is to 
the court and not to their Clients. The main source of factual 
information is the first opinion by Lord Woolman favouring 
the Contractor. In appeal, the Lord President, Lord Carloway 
supported the opinion of Lord Woolman (for the Defendant) 
but this was overturned by the opinions of two of the three 
appeal judges (Lords Menzies and Glennie) who supported 
the Pursuer’s position. According to current news reviews 
(e.g. New Civil Engineer, 6th June 2018), the case is set to 
be heard by the Supreme Court.
3.1  Risk
There is always risk associated with tunnelling, during con-
struction and, later, in terms of operational performance. 
The concept of ‘acceptable risk’ is often used in geotechnics. 
For a risk to be as low as reasonably possible (ALARP), it 
must be possible to demonstrate that the cost involved in 
reducing the risk further would be disproportionate to the 
benefit, although it is unclear that that principle was adopted 
here for the Glendoe headrace tunnel. When deciding on 
using a tunnel boring machine (TBM), the decision needs 
to be taken, early on, as to whether to line the tunnel fully or 
not. This depends upon the quality of rock expected and the 
risk that is to be accepted. Concrete ring segments can be 
erected in effect as part of a manufacturing system, locked 
into place behind the machine circumferentially and pushed 
against by the machine as it advances. The rings must be 
designed at an early stage to carry the predicted rock load. 
Where rock stand-up time is considered adequate, then more 
time can be taken to erect a liner in situ, to carry the load 
after the TBM has cut the rock, although there will be some 
risks involved. For such cases, the TBM design is simpler 
but a decision must be taken on how much load to design 
for (Terzaghi 1946).
The original concept for the Glendoe headrace tunnel was 
for a drill and blasted, shotcrete-lined tunnel apart from areas 
where a full in situ concrete or steel liner was required. Lord 
Carloway (2018) states at paragraph 22 that “In due course, 
the proposal to have a completely lined tunnel, which formed 
the basis for Part 6 (of the contract), was abandoned”. It is 
noted that the design life of 75 years was in Part 6.3.2 of the 
contract according to Lord Carloway (paragraph 19, 2018); 
so presumably, this concept of design life was linked origi-
nally to the idea of a fully lined tunnel.
An alternative design by Finnish company, Pöyry Energy 
JV (Pöyry) for the Contractor, Hochtief, was proposed using 
a TBM for construction in the design–build contract. It was 
calculated that using this method, the tunnel could remain 
60% unlined (Class I) (Lord Carloway 2018, paragraph 23). 
The highest class of support envisaged (Class IV) shown in 
the Rock Excavation Classification of Hochtief, reproduced 
in simplified form here as Tables 1 and 2, was steel sets with 
shotcrete but this was not actually used. Class 3, which was 
used for only 0.3% of the tunnel, according to Woolman 
(2016, paragraph 67), comprised 100 mm of shotcrete with 
steel mesh circumferentially and rock anchorages. The Rock 
Support Methodology, proposed by Pöyry was accepted by 
SSE.
The acceptance of risk of minor rock falls was high as is 
apparently normal for Norwegian unlined, hard-rock tunnels 
(Palmström and Berdal 1987). Broch (2000) states that:
“Most of the Norwegian hydropower tunnels have only 
2–4% concrete or shotcrete lining; only in a few cases, 
has it been necessary to increase this to 40–60%. The 
low percentage of lining is due not only to favourable 
tunnelling conditions—it is first and foremost the con-
sequence of a support philosophy which accepts some 
falling rock during the operation period of a water tun-
nel. As long as rockfalls in certain parts of the tunnel 
do not occur frequently and increase the head loss, 
a reasonable number of small blockages spread out 
along the tunnel will not harm the tunnel or disturb the 
operation of the hydro power station.”
A major geotechnical question follows: whether a tunnel 
with smooth, ‘rifle bore’ sides as produced by TBM presents 
a lower, long-term risk of wedge failure compared to an 
irregular tunnel formed by drill and blast in the same rock 
mass. It is evident that drill and blast construction exposes 
and emphasises weak areas and discontinuities as overbreak 
zones and that such weak zones are far less evident in TBM-
constructed tunnels—but does this represent a reduced risk 
in the long term? In the case of the Glendoe headrace tunnel, 
the lining requirement was reduced from a predicted 100% 
by Jacobs for a drill and blast tunnel, to less than 1% for the 
as-constructed tunnel, using a TBM, albeit that this was no 
doubt partly on the basis of hydraulic roughness. One of the 
tunnelling experts, Professor Grøv noted that “… mapping 
a TBM tunnel is a difficult exercise. Because of its smooth 
surface ‘details may get lost’” (Woolman 2016, paragraph 
174). It must be concluded that, whilst an observer might 
judge the risk of rock fall in a drill and blast tunnel more 
severely than the same risk in a TBM-bored tunnel, in the 
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longer-term, under operation, the risks will be essentially 
the same.
Eight months following the satisfactory completion of 
the tunnel and handover of the tunnel from the contrac-
tor to the owner, a large-scale collapse occurred although 
there are indications that the tunnel was collapsing 
throughout that period. The tunnel was blocked over a long 
section and the Owner took the decision at some stage 
later to construct a diversion tunnel which was eventually 
built by drill and blast by a 2nd contractor, Bam Nuttall. 
It was decided to fully line this diversion tunnel with a 
500-mm secondary concrete waterproof lining. Further-
more, a 100-mm-thick ‘concrete’ lining was applied, in 
retrospect, to about half the length of the headrace tunnel 
that had already been constructed by Hochtief (Appleyard 
2012). This decision to line a tunnel that was originally 
constructed as essentially unlined expresses either the 
adoption of a reduced level of risk by the Owner in hind-
sight or a more realistic appreciation of the hidden hazards 
in the TBM-constructed walls.
3.2  Geological Conditions in the Headrace Tunnel
The geology of the headrace tunnel which was 6.2-km 
long was set out broadly in Lord Woolman’s opinion, 
in particular in a cross section, that was taken from Dr. 
Smith’s (British Geological Survey, “BGS”) presentation 
to the court (Fig. 6). The BGS reports that these rocks 
are a series of Pre-Cambrian, folded and faulted, meta-
morphosed mudstones and sandstones. Figure 6 shows a 
major fault, the Conagleann Fault Zone (CFZ)—mapped 
at the surface and extrapolated downwards and predicted 
Table 2  Support category of Hochtief (simplified)
Support category Class I Class II Class III Class IV
Description No support, or spot bolting 
and/or local shotcrete in 
the roof
Systematic support upper 
120°
Systematic support over full perimeter
Shotcrete 50 mm if required Upper 120° 50–80 mm, wire 
mesh.
100 mm + wire mesh, full 
periphery
200 mm + wire mesh, full 
periphery
Bolt Spot, 22 mm ø, L = 2.2 m 1.4 m (radial) × 1.86 m, 
22 mm ø, L = 2.2 m stag-
gered 4–3–4, etc.
1.1 m radial × 0.93 m, 
22 mm ø, L = 2.2 m stag-
gered 8–7–8, etc.
22 mm ø, L = 2.2 m if required
Ribs (if required) None None None Ribs 1–1.25 m
Options A A, E, F A, B, D, E, F, L B, C, D, F, G, H, I, J, K, L
 A Increase application of shotcrete, extension of application of shotcrete.
 B Bolts below springline (by separate drilling equipment)
 C Additional bolts
 D Increase capacity and length of bolts (e.g. 32 mm ø)
 E Bolted U-shaped profile for upper 120°
 F Hydraulic activation of cutterhead shield support
 G Forward probing
 H Pressure relief drillholes
 I Forward compensation grouting
 J Stronger steel arches
 K Spiles
 L Monitoring
Fig. 6  Section along the head-
race tunnel, showing location of 
Conagleann Fault Zone where 
the collapse occurred. (traced 
from Dr. Smith’s presentation to 
court, slides 5 and 7, Woolman 
2016)
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to be encountered between chainages 2040–2210 (170 m). 
The CFZ was anticipated as being hazardous and David 
Taylor, the engineering geologist of Hochtief, warned the 
TBM crew to take “extreme care” in that area of the tunnel 
(Woolman 2016, paragraph 70). In the event, Mr. Spiers, 
SSE’s resident engineer recorded that the conditions were 
class 1 throughout: “The TBM has now passed through the 
predicted zone of the Conagleann Fault, but indications of 
its existence were imperceptible” (Woolman 2016, para-
graph 71). Such mismatches between supposedly oner-
ous faults, mapped at the ground surface, and conditions 
encountered in tunnels are not unusual (West 1983).
Throughout the tunnelling, geological conditions were 
mapped and the geotechnical classification applied by 
Taylor with his findings and the sheets submitted to the 
Fig. 7  Rock Excavation Clas-
sification sheet for chainages 
2117–2101, copied from Carlo-
way (2018), Appendix 5, page 
137. Description reads: “Some 
shear zones with QMS kakerite, 
local slab formation and block-
fall in sidewalls. Rotate CII 
support to LHS (left hand side) 
from CH 2117 to 2107. Extend 
shotcrete to maximum extent 
in shotcrete bay and backfill 
voids”. Note that the boxes 
dealing with erosion potential 
are ticked as “Single Non-erod-
ible < 10 cm” and “None”. The 
sheet is signed as Prepared by 
D. Taylor (23/8/07), Confirmed 
(uncertain who for) by J. Ager 
(18/9/07) and Approved for SSE 
by D. Williams (20/09/07)
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supervising engineering geologist of Jacobs (Derek Wil-
liams) for approval on behalf of SSE (Fig. 7).
‘Geological Fold Out Mapping’ sheets were produced on 
a 25-m basis and one of these was reproduced by Carlo-
way (2018) as Appendix 6, page 138, and is presented here 
as Fig. 8. On this sheet, there was a table of terms to be 
used in description. This listed the Rock Types that could 
be encountered as:
Quartzite
Quartz Schist
Quartz Mica Schist
Granite
Kakerite (sic)
Mylonite
This table is clearly not a comprehensive list of geological 
terms and reflects a choice, specific for the tunnel. The last 
two terms were to be applied to faulted rocks.
Kakirite is not a term used in the Geological Society of 
London Field Guide on Mapping Geological Structures 
(McClay 1987) or even in the Penguin Dictionary of Geol-
ogy (Whitten and Brooks 1972) and is not used in fault rock 
classification in the UK (Sibson 1977; Woodcock and Mort 
2008). Where the term is used, in Switzerland and else-
where, the rock is typically equivalent to Fault Breccia and 
Gouge in the UK. The material is sometimes unconsolidated 
and weak, but it can be cemented with secondary minerals 
such as calcite or quartz.
The term ‘mylonite’ was probably used to include ‘cata-
clasite’, both of which are cohesive, fault rocks.
3.3  Geotechnical Conditions
Jacobs, who were employed by SSE to complete the site 
investigation studies, to “prepare the client’s design”, and to 
supervise the works, according to Reynolds (2017), antici-
pated 97.5% of the excavation to be in ‘good’ rock (Wool-
man 2016, page 9). According to Lord Carloway (2018, 
paragraph 29), Pöyry anticipated 68.7% to be Class I, 23.8% 
to be Class II, 6% to be Class III and 1.5% to be Class IV in 
their design of 2004.
Fig. 8  Part of section where collapse occurred, from the Geologi-
cal Fold Out Mapping Sheet for chainages 2025–2010, reproduced 
in Lord Carloway’s Opinion at page 138. Note that the first two rock 
names are typed (presumably typical), with just the strengths added 
in writing (very strong and strong). Rock type 3 is added, in writing, 
as “closely jointed fresh QUARTZ MICA SCHIST, moderately weak 
to moderately strong”. Note also the comment at the top of the page 
“many polished undulating QMS joint surfaces forming thin flakey 
slabs”. This is the likely material that collapsed to form the fine pile 
of debris seen in Fig. 10. The two discontinuity directions 48/300 in 
the fault zone and 80/110 in the general rock, form an adverse wedge 
with a third joint dipping, say, at 70/200. Note that “Joint Details” are 
defined as “3 + r”, meaning three joint sets plus random joints, for the 
Q-system
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According to Lord Woolman (2016, paragraph 
67), Hochtief in the excavated tunnel, “found the 
tunnel to be very dry and the rock mass conditions 
much better than predicted”. Lord Woolman lists the 
Classes of expected support vs. as-built, as follows: 
Expected As Built
Class I 58.9% 84.3%
Class II 23.1% 15.4%
Class III 14.3% 0.3%
Class IV 3.7% 0%
“sufficiently complete for safe operation” (Woolman 2016 
paragraph 79).
There are patchy details recorded on the operations in 
Woolman (2016, paragraphs 89–95). There were apparently 
1700 sensors installed to monitor ‘every aspect of operation’ 
but these were reduced to 179 for fear of overwhelming the 
engineers, 140 with audible alarms (Woolman 2016, para-
graph 86). According to the same paragraph, “the scheme 
will automatically shut down if they detect a critical fault”—
but did not do so, apparently, prior to the eventual massive 
rock collapse following an 8-month history of indicative fac-
tors. In 2009, there were no alarms for needle valve open-
ing, net head, or head loss (Woolman 2016, paragraph 33). 
There is no further mention of the sensors in the opinions 
of the Lords.
The scheme was handed over in December 2008, but the 
first mention of operations in Lord Woolman’s report, after 
acceptance by the National Grid in January 2009, which 
was “undertaken by Andritz using its own specialist instru-
ments”, was in “late May or early June 2009” when Sandi-
lands “noticed” a head reading of 584 m (Woolman 2016, 
paragraph 89). The net head at Glendoe was designed to be 
between 600 and 606 m (Woolman 2016, paragraph 31).
Sandilands stated that “failure was not in my mind at all, 
this was a brand new hydro scheme” (Woolman 2016, para-
graph 89). There was then a litany of records (what was the 
process of recording?) including “unusual thumping noises” 
over a period of 2 h on 30th June, culminating in Sandi-
lands and Wallace of Hochtief noting a “sediment plume” 
discharge 5 weeks later, on 4th August, but this fact (indicat-
ing some kind of collapse or erosion at the very least), was 
not investigated. It would be interesting to know more about 
the operations. How many times was the system powered 
up over the 8-month period? What was the system of record 
keeping?
3.5  Precedent
Previous collapses that occurred in 1990, in an ‘unlined’, 
unpressurised tunnel, owned by Scottish Hydro-Electric 
(SHE) were dismissed as irrelevant by Lord Woolman (2016, 
paragraphs 23 and 24)—all tunnels having their own issues, 
and the case is not raised again by the appeal judges.
However, the 1990 collapse was in unlined tunnels con-
structed through Scottish, metamorphic, faulted rocks, as 
at Glendoe, and was written up in a paper published by the 
Institution of Civil Engineers, UK, by Cameron and Sandi-
lands (1996). The case is worth examining in some detail, 
not least because N. Sandilands is presumably the same per-
son who figures extensively in the Glendoe case that started 
in 2004, as project manager of SHE, later SSE. As noted 
earlier, Sandilands “sometime in late May or early June 
2009” noticed a very low net head reading of 584 m in the 
Whatever the numbers, it is clear that conditions were 
found to be unexpectedly good in the tunnel compared to 
conditions predicted from ground investigation, prior to the 
works, although the ground investigation data and interpre-
tation are not presented in the opinions of the four Lords.
The terminology adopted in the Hochtief Rock Excavation 
Classification and Risk Assessment sheet is set out in Tables 1, 
2 and 3, which have not been criticised as incorrect or inade-
quate by any party to my knowledge. Tables 1 and 2 addressed 
the support to be provided for rock masses of different quali-
ties. For faulted rock, under Class II (fair to poor rock), in the 
row beginning “Foliation/discontinuity” it says, “Single Non-
erodible < 10 cm”. Another potential hazard, included under 
Class II is “High potential for systematic rock wedges affecting 
the upper half of the excavation”. In the row headed “Foliation/
discontinuity”, Class III (poor rock) includes < 0.5 m of “erod-
ible kakirite/weak erodible rock” and Class IV (poor to very 
poor rock) includes multiple layers of “loose erodible fault 
gouge/kakirite” of greater than 0.5-m thickness.
According to Woolman (2016, paragraph 43), SSE 
approved Pöyry’s detailed design before construction began. 
This included the ‘Headrace TBM Excavation Rock Support 
Methodology (‘RSM’)’ including Table 3 (which is part of 
the original Table 11 that was agreed by all parties as part of 
the rock support system) that addresses ‘risk’. In the case of 
encountering “erodible kakerite” (Classes III and IV), a high-
risk situation (9) would be made low risk (3) by the application 
of shotcrete, thereby reducing the likelihood rating from 3 to 1.
Interestingly, in Table 3, the risk of wedge failure was 
considered relatively low: “Risk is judged as generally low 
in bolted and shotcreted parts. Locally detachments possible: 
risk increased/high in unsupported parts” and this was to be 
mitigated by “Slow rate of impoundment; regular pattern of 
drainholes in shotcreted areas”.
3.4  The Operations
The tunnels and power station were taken over by the Project 
Manager Neil Sandilands of SSE on 18 December 2008 as 
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tunnel. His colleague Brian Still said that it was probably 
a calibration error, which Sandilands accepted because he 
“did not have failure in his mind at all” (Woolman 2016, 
paragraph 89). On this statement hangs a lot, regarding the 
risk that was allocated to the Contractor and the risk that 
was accepted by SSE.
One might accept this at face value if Sandilands had not 
been involved in the previous failures and reparatory works 
at North Lochay. In that case, when an overflow occurred 
at a major intake, the tunnel was dewatered. On inspection, 
two major collapses were found: one of 1000 m3, the other of 
200 m3 together with 32 other significant rock falls through-
out the tunnels. Both of the major collapses occurred where 
concrete arches had been used (not tied together) to support 
the rock mass. The tunnels were by then 40 years old, but 
nevertheless, the risk of using unlined or poorly supported 
tunnels was obvious. Following the more than 30 rock fall 
failures at North Lochay, the authors, Cameron and Sandi-
lands, were asked questions regarding the geological assess-
ment (Cameron and Sandilands 1997):
Questions by T. H. Douglas and T. J. M. Patterson (Mott 
Macdonald): “Both the major rock falls occurred where 
faults intersected or were in close proximity. Were the 
faults or any other potential problems in the roof fall areas 
noted during geological logging carried out at the time of 
construction?”
Answers: “The original geological logs show the fault” 
and “The original geological records were found to be both 
adequate in scope and accurate” and “As discussed previ-
ously, more rigorous inspections are now being carried out 
and a consultant geologist is retained”.
It would have been anticipated that, following this experi-
ence published in ICE, the Project Manager would have had 
rockfalls directly in mind, unless he was satisfied that the 
smooth tunnel, constructed by the TBM, had no potential to 
collapse. If the Owner of a scheme, despite knowledge of the 
risk involved, selects an unlined tunnel scheme, for a highly 
pressurised headrace tunnel of more than 6-km length, then 
so be it. This is apparently the case at Glendoe where a bid 
for an unlined tunnel constructed by TBM was accepted as 
an alternative to a drill and blasted, fully lined tunnel.
3.6  The Extent of the Collapse
Lord Woolman’s opinion on the extent of the collapse are, 
he acknowledged, “pure guesswork” (Woolman 2016, para-
graph 150) as are the causes, in that there was no investiga-
tion carried out of the collapse and the blocked section of 
tunnel remains blocked. The blocked off length of tunnel was 
originally thought to be 270 m (Woolman 2016, paragraph 
110) but was later established by an electronic theodolite 
to be 71 m (Woolman 2016, paragraph 143). A volume of 
1394 m3 collapsed rock can be calculated to be within the 
blocked tunnel section (cross-sectional area × 71 m). The 
amount of collapsed material is estimated as somewhere 
between 2374 and 13,000 m3 (Woolman 2016, paragraph 
150). The balance of the smallest volume is 1480 m3 which 
must be partly, or fully, distributed in the 600 m of debris, 
running down the tunnel towards the turbines (Woolman 
2016, paragraph 109). If the collapse was 13,000 m3, then 
a large proportion of this collapse would remain above the 
blocked length of tunnel. The shortest length of the actual 
collapse zone was estimated at 8–10 m of tunnel by Dr. 
Büchi and 71 ms according to Professor Sloan (Woolman 
2016, paragraph 150). Figure 9 illustrates the collapse, based 
on these estimates, the length of debris outrun and pictures 
of the debris. It is calculated that the collapsed rock might 
extend up to between 110 (Büchi) and 172 (Sloan) m above 
the tunnel (more than half way towards the ground surface) 
(Fig. 10). 
3.7  The Causes of the Collapse
Lord Woolman in his opinion (Woolman 2016) finds that 
it is impossible to determine the cause of collapse and sup-
ports Dr. Büchi’s generalised view that it was a “geological 
accident” (paragraph 151).
He argues that the most likely explanation of the collapse 
was, essentially, “the deterioration of thin single shears” 
when submerged, “by slaking”, “between good rock in 
between” (paragraph 152) followed by progressive collapse, 
dominated by erosion. This theory relies on ‘slakeable’ 
material being present (of which there is no evidence) and 
‘erodible rock’ being present, again of which there is very 
little evidence. Slakeability is a term that is used to define 
completely weathered rock; highly weathered rock (soil) 
does not slake, by definition (Anon 1995). This mechanism 
of failure was adopted by all three Appeal Lords, without 
question.
There are other factors to be considered as listed in 
Table 4. Firstly the ‘slaking theory’ needs to be addressed.
According to Lord Carloway (2018) (paragraph 54) Pro-
fessor Sloan stated that:
“The defenders had identified erodible rock in shear 
zones within this fault, but they had failed to support 
and protect them in the manner required by the works 
information and design. The defenders’ failure to 
install sufficient support had been directly responsible 
for the collapse.”
and at paragraph 58:
“There had been a significant amount of erodible rock 
in the collapsed zone.” and that “The works informa-
tion and design required every shear zone to be sup-
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ported by the application of shotcrete over the full 
perimeter, as the minimum class III support.”
and at paragraph 61 he continues:
“At chainages 2117–2101, there had been evidence of 
faulting, using the criteria of erodible rock. The REC 
had mentioned kakirite and erodible rock over quite a 
length. This had not been reproduced in the mapping. 
The REC sheet findings indicated class III.”
Much of Professor Sloan’s evidence cannot be confirmed 
from the information in the public domain. Fortunately, 
however, the last statement can be checked. Lord Carloway 
(2018) includes in his opinion the Geological Mapping Sheet 
for chainages 2125–2100 at Appendix 5 and the Rock Exca-
vation Sheet for Chainages 2117–2101 at Appendix 6. Read-
ing these records, reproduced here as Figs. 7 and 8, there is 
no mention of erodible rock (just QMS Kakerite), nor “over 
quite a length”. The word “erodible” is missing from the 
Rock Excavation Classification (REC) sheet and from the 
Mapping Sheet. The boxes ticked on the REC indicate Class 
1 support conditions, not Class III.
It needs to be repeated that the word kakirite does not 
equate to ‘erodible’, and Class II might have more clearly 
specified ‘non-erodible kakirite’ to distinguish this from the 
‘erodible kakirite’ in Classes III and IV in Table 1.
The engineering geologist David Taylor (of Hochtief) 
noted the presence of Quartz Mica Schist Kakerite—pre-
sumably meaning ‘fault breccia’. He describes this on the 
Fig. 9  Interpretations of debris 
volumes and dimensions at 
Glendoe tunnel collapse. a 
Shows an interpretation of a 
rock fall of 2874 m3, blocking 
off 71 m of tunnel, with the 
rest of the debris stretching out 
600 m towards the turbines. 
It is assumed that this is for 
a block fall from the roof, of 
dimensions 10 m × 5 m. The 
rock would have fallen from a 
void extending 172 m above 
the tunnel invert. b Shows an 
interpretation of an alternative 
model with collapse through-
out the 71 m and debris up to 
13,000 m3. For this scenario, 
there would remain debris to a 
depth of about 85 m above the 
tunnel invert and voided ground 
up to 110 m. For both models, 
there is comminuted, disinte-
grated debris blocking the upper 
part of the headrace tunnel (see 
Fig. 10 plus Sect. 4)
Fig. 10  Collapsed ground (upstream end)—taken from Woolman 
(2016). Note folded and faulted rock in the walls of the tunnel. This 
must be close to the fault zone. Note that the rock mass is broken 
down to very fine material, which is remarkable, given the decision 
not to line this section, and that no one could see the fault. The inter-
pretation is that the material in  situ was disintegrated, probably by 
tectonic action, rather like the ‘Rashings’ material in the South Wales 
Coalfield which looks intact but on extraction breaks down to sigmoi-
dal fragments
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Mapping Sheet as “many polished undulating QMS joint 
surfaces forming thin flakey (sic) slabs”.
Professor Broch visited “practically all” the locations 
described by Pöyry (the designer) and took samples to check 
for swelling clay minerals which would make the rock more-
susceptible to slaking (Woolman 2016, paragraph 75). Tests 
conducted at the Norwegian Technical University did not 
indicate any potential problems due to swelling.
In my opinion, there is far more evidence of the collapse 
being dominated by large-scale wedge failure and rock col-
lapse on incipient discontinuities than by erosion. In Table 4, 
I list some of the factors. Firstly, there are the discontinuity 
measurements in Fig. 8. The two measurements of 48/3001 
(for a fault zone rock that is moderately weak to moderately 
strong, meaning 5–50 MPa) and of 80/100 taken in the area 
of sheared QMS require just one more discontinuity dipping 
at, say (precision not required), 70/200 to form an unstable 
wedge as shown in Fig. 11. It is noted that Taylor classified 
the jointing as “3 + r”, which translates to three sets plus ran-
dom joints in the Q classification (Barton et al. 1974). Two 
‘sets’ (measurements) are recorded, but where is the third? 
There are possible traces in Fig. 8 with the correct orienta-
tion but the traces die out, presumably as incipient discon-
tinuities. Secondly, there is a photograph of large blocks of 
rock from the downstream end of the debris, reproduced here 
as Fig. 12. It is probable that the failure was the result of the 
falling of large wedges of rock, released by discontinuities, 
over a period of 6–8 months, leading to the collapse of rock 
up to 110–172 m above the tunnel as depicted in Fig. 9. 
Table 4  Evidence regarding causes of collapse
Hazard Evidence in Geological Fold Out Map-
ping sheet (Fig. 8)
Evidence on the rock excavation clas-
sification sheet (Fig. 7)
Other factors
Erosion Absent “Some shear zones with QMS kakerite” 
(sic) are noted on the REC. It does not 
state ‘erodible kakerite’, and erodible 
kakerite is not indicated on the Geo-
logical Fold Out Mapping Sheet
The row headed ‘Foliation/discontinu-
ity’ is ticked under Class I—meaning 
‘none’
There is no tick in the box indicating 
‘erodible kakerite’ (Class III)
Samples were taken by Professor Broch 
at almost all locations where poten-
tially erodible rock had been identified 
(Woolman 2016, paragraph 75). Samples 
were tested at the Norwegian Techni-
cal University and showed no signs of 
slakeability
Wedge failure Two discontinuity measurements were 
taken, one for an evident fault zone 
in excess of 1.5 m in thickness. Dip 
is 48/300. There is collapse of 0.7 m 
depth, several metres laterally, associ-
ated with the fault in the crown of the 
tunnel. The rock in the fault zone is 
described as “Fresh QMS” but strength 
is only “moderately weak to moder-
ately strong”, which means strength as 
low as 5–50 MPa. Rock of 5–12.5 MPa 
can be broken by hand and is very 
‘weak’ for rock otherwise described as 
‘fresh’
The 2nd discontinuity measurement 
is recorded as 80/110. The adjacent 
rock is described as “many QMS joint 
surfaces forming thin flakey slabs”. 
‘Thinly’ equates to 60–200 mm
For a critical wedge to be formed, a third 
joint dipping at perhaps 70° dipping 
in a 200 direction is required. There is 
no such joint recorded on the sheet but 
there are traces in that direction and the 
‘joint details box’ (for the Q-system) 
states three sets plus random, which 
means that there were other joints 
present than the two measured
Most of the boxes are ticked as Class II, 
including the hazard of “High potential 
for systematic rock wedges affecting 
the upper half of the excavation”—in 
hindsight, this hazard might have been 
dealt with best by full lining
The two photographs presented as Figs. 10 
and 12 show very different conditions
Figure 10 shows the rock mass com-
minuted to fine debris as if from a 
rock burst. This is a photograph of the 
upstream end. Figure 12 shows large 
blocks of irregular rock that have fallen 
from the roof, downstream
The size of the collapse, stretching 
away from the tunnel by estimates that 
range up to 172 m means that it is best 
explained as progressive collapse of rock 
wedges
1 Dip/dip direction.
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Considering the scale of mapping and logging, metre-by-
metre, the opportunity to visibly assess, globally, the faulted 
rock mass over tens of metres was evidently lacking, despite 
the best intentions of all parties.
At the upstream end of the tunnel blockage, the rock is 
comminuted to small pieces as seen in Fig. 10. The rock 
could not have travelled far to become broken up. It has not 
been abraded by flowing water. It must have been exposed 
in the walls of the tunnel as ostensibly intact rock that has 
been broken down, possibly by rock fall-out on incipient 
discontinuities.
As Lord Woolman (2016) describes the situation at para-
graph 180: “Many experienced tunnellers scrutinised the 
HRT both during and after the TBM drive. They included 
engineering geologists, tunnel designers, engineers and the 
TBM crew. They were actively looking for problems. None 
of them saw signs of faults that might threaten tunnel stabil-
ity. None recommended the installation of a higher level of 
support at particular locations”.
Lord Carloway in his Appeal opinion (2018) reports that 
Pöyry had only inspected part of the tunnel and not the col-
lapsed zone (Ch2121–Ch2050) but there seems little doubt 
that the zone which collapsed had been adequately inspected 
and examined by many experienced professionals.
Lord Carloway (2018) concludes at paragraph 148 that 
“There was a prime facie case, based on a combination of 
the mapping and REC sheets, that Class IV support ought to 
have been installed”. That opinion appears to be incorrect, 
and an example of a legal judgement, in hindsight, attempt-
ing to over-ride the opinions of professional engineers and 
engineering geologists, working in the tunnel at the time. 
Those engineering geologists and engineers were working 
to an approved system which accounted for localised behav-
iour, over a few metres length of tunnel, but, in my opinion, 
failed to account for much larger wedges. In hindsight, there 
is no doubt that the tunnel could have been made safe if it 
had been completely lined, at a cost, but that is a fundamen-
tal failure of the REC system, not the application of the REC 
to the tunnel which was applied diligently, and signed off by 
Derek Williams of Jacobs on behalf of SSE.
On 7th June 2011, the defendants referred the issue of 
responsibility for the collapse of the HRT to Adjudication. 
The adjudicator (Robert Galbraith QC) found that:
“…the rock support works as designed and con-
structed did not constitute a Defect for the purposes of 
Clause 11.2(15). It is true that a collapse subsequently 
occurred. However, that was not because there was a 
Defect for the purposes of the Contract. It occurred 
simply because there are inherent risks of rock falls 
and collapses in unlined tunnels. These are part of the 
risks that the Parties are aware of when the price is 
being negotiated. The incidence of such rock falls and 
collapses can be greatly reduced by using a fully lined 
tunnel, but this would cost far more than an unlined 
tunnel.” (Carloway 2018, paragraph 51).
Dr. Wilhelm, giving evidence, explained that the shear 
zones must have been interconnected above the HRT, but 
he did not say that the collapse could have been anticipated 
Fig. 11  Stereogram of tunnel in 305 direction, plunging at about 
7° with two discontinuities 48/300 and 80/100 (as measured in the 
Geological Mapping Sheet, in Fig.  8) and a hypothetical third joint 
(70/200). The three discontinuities produce an unstable wedge in the 
crown of the tunnel. Note that Taylor classified the rock as “3 + r” 
meaning three sets plus random. Stereogram produced by software 
UNWEDGE by Rocscience, Canada
Fig. 12  Collapsed ground (downstream end). Note that the ground is 
largely made up of large fallen blocks (according to this photo). Pho-
tograph from Woolman (2016)
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(Carloway 2018, paragraph 204). Carloway continues: “The 
commercial judge listened to the pursuer’s submission on 
precisely this point and made positive findings that noth-
ing could have been seen in the tunnel”. In my opinion, the 
fault structure, which collapsed to form a void extending up 
to 170 m above the tunnel crown and occupying a length 
of tunnel between 10 and 71 m, was just too large to be 
recognised by the conscientious observers. The only way 
to ensure safety against collapse in such a tunnel is to use 
full periphery liners, of 500-mm thickness, as was done in 
the remedial, diversion tunnel constructed by Bam Nuttall.
3.8  The Q‑System
At Glendoe, the Hochtief geologist, David Taylor, carried 
out studies, and then produced documents that were later 
“approved” on behalf of SSE by the consulting engineering 
geologist employed by Jacobs. As Lord Woolman (2016) 
notes, “As he signed them many weeks later, he had ample 
opportunity to cross-check Taylor’s classification against the 
findings of the Q-system” (paragraphs 65, 183 and 185).
The Q value is determined on the basis of three param-
eters multiplied by one another and adjusted by a fourth 
according to the importance/use of the tunnel (Barton et al. 
1974; Norwegian Geotechnical Institute (NGI) 2015):
The first parameter is RQD/Jn which translates as degree 
of jointing (or block size).
RQD was originally defined as a simple index for 
assessing rock quality in boreholes (Pells et al. 2017). It 
is measured as the percentage of rock core (typically over 
1 or 1.5 m), recovered in pieces that are 100 mm or more 
in length. It is fair to assume that the RQD in this case was 
approaching 100% in terms of observable joints lacking any 
tensile strength, other than in the zone of QMS with flaky 
slabs.
Jn is more difficult to define. Norwegian Geotechnical 
Institute (NGI) (2015) states that “Joints within a joint set 
will be nearly parallel to another and will display a char-
acteristic joint spacing”. The Geological Mapping Sheet, 
reproduced in Fig. 7, shows one dominant fault structure, 
dipping at 48/300. The fault zone has an apparent thickness 
of about 2.5 m meaning a true thickness of about 1.7 m. One 
joint measurement in the side walls is given as 80/110 with 
the adjacent rock described as “many polished undulating 
QMS joint surfaces forming thin flakey slabs”. No doubt 
the RQD would have been measured as lower than 100% 
if these close, weakly bonded, incipient fractures had been 
included, as open joints. This is an example of where engi-
neering judgement is required, and it was incipient fractures 
like these, induced by tectonic stress and probably pervasive 
for many metres away from the tunnel, that probably resulted 
in the fine rock mass that blocked the tunnel at the upstream 
end (Fig. 10).
The fault zone and much of the rest of the rock is 
described as “moderately weak to moderately strong”. It 
can be interpreted that BS:5930 1999 was being used for 
the description, rather than BS EN ISO 14689-1:2003 which 
uses a different range of strengths and lacks the term ‘moder-
ately weak’. ‘Moderately weak’ rock as defined in BS:5930 
(British Standards Institution 1999) has uniaxial compres-
sive strength from 5 to 12.5 MPa and pieces can be broken 
by hand. This is a remarkably low strength for a rock that 
is otherwise described as ‘fresh’ and might be explained by 
incipient disintegration.
For this exercise, Taylor chose to classify the rock as three 
joint sets plus random, which would designate Jn as 12. All 
in all, RQD/Jn, would probably equal 8.3.
The second parameter is Jr/Ja = Joint Friction.
Norwegian Geotechnical Institute (NGI) (2015) does not 
provide a parameter for ‘polished’ joints. The parameter for 
smooth/undulating joints (as recorded on Taylor’s sheet) is 
2, but my intuition would be to assume that the value for 
slicken-sided, planar joints might be more appropriate (0.5). 
For Ja, I would judge a value of 4 (assuming no infill, but 
with talc coating (as recorded in the Mapping Sheet) and a 
residual friction value ‘ ∅r’ of 8°–16°).
So, my estimate for Jr/Ja would be between 0.5 and 0.125.
The third parameter is ‘Active Stress’ and = Jw/SRF, 
where Jw is a ‘Joint water reduction factor’ and SRF is a 
‘Stress Reduction Factor’. Jw is 1.0 (dry excavation or 
minor inflow). The Stress Reduction Factor would not be 
too high—there was no evidence of rock bursts other than 
the interpretation of the post-failure picture, reproduced at 
Fig. 10, or swelling and a value of 2.5 might be appropriate 
(single weak zone at depth > 50 m)
So, Jw/SRF = 1/2.5 = 0.4.
That means that the rock quality, Q value would range 
between 8.3 × 0.5 × 0.4 (= 1.66) and 8.3 × 0.125 × 0.4 
(= 0.415) for Taylor’s classification of 3 + r (joint sets). 
These numbers relate to ‘poor’ to ‘very poor’ rock mass 
qualities as defined in the Q classification.
1.66–0.415 was probably the value that Jacobs were 
using to check Taylor’s assessment of the need for rock 
support. Firstly, however, an Excavation Support Ratio 
(ESR) must be defined. This is tunnel span in metres/
ESR, which can be taken as 5/1.3 = 3.85. For water tun-
nels (excluding high pressure penstocks) the recommended 
value of ESR is 1.6. ESR = 1.3 is recommended for surge 
chambers and access tunnels; ESR = 1.0 is recommended 
for power houses and civil defence chambers (Norwegian 
Geotechnical Institute (NGI) 2015).
To use these values, it is necessary to examine the 
support class graph, reproduced here at Fig. 13. There 
would be some support required in the crown, less so in 
the walls of the tunnel and certainly no need for a fully 
lined option of 100% shotcrete (100 mm) and bolts. This 
The Glendoe Tunnel Collapse in Scotland 
1 3
complies with what was done (Class 2 plus backfilling of 
voids with shotcrete).
Lord Carloway (2018) makes a great deal in his Appeal 
opinion of the quote from Taylor’s assessment note of 
“Some shear zones with QMS kakerite, local slab forma-
tion and blockfall in sidewalls”—assuming that ‘kakerite’ 
equates to erodible rock that should have been shotcreted 
automatically. It is a term which was referred to 23 times 
by the Chairman of the Appeal in his opinion (Carloway 
2018) who supported the Contractor’s position and was 
also referred to by the other two Lords of Appeal (Menzies 
2018; Glennie 2018), who overturned the original finding 
for the Contractor.
But as stated earlier, kakerite (sic) bands—one of the only 
two fault descriptors specified—can be narrow and non-
erodible (in Class II) and, despite the fact that a shear zone 
was recorded by Taylor, this is not shown on his Geological 
Fold Out Map presented in Fig. 8. It must be concluded that 
the shear zones were not considered as important to stability 
or were too narrow to map. In hindsight, the probable cause 
of the collapse, in my opinion, was the overall “moderately 
weak to moderately strong” rock structure, with multiple 
polished surfaces of low frictional strength, and a third joint 
dipping in a direction approximately 200, forming a wedge. 
The nature of a large-scale collapse due to weak, incipient 
fractures, was not dealt with well in the risk table (Table 1), 
should have been indicative of Class III or even Class IV 
rather than Class II, and was a hazard that was not apparently 
recognised by any of the parties that inspected the tunnel.
3.9  Inspections
Inspections by the designers (Pöyry) and the Owners engi-
neer, Jacobs, apparently checking the rating using the Q-sys-
tem, failed to identify any areas of concern (Woolman 2016, 
paragraph 65). Indeed, at the CFZ, the SSE resident engineer 
had recorded in minutes to a meeting that conditions were 
Class I throughout and that “the indications of its existence 
were imperceptible” (Woolman 2016, paragraph 71).
What one can glean from this is that the observing geolo-
gists and engineers failed to identify the potential mecha-
nism of collapse despite careful, focussed inspection.
According to Woolman (2016, paragraph 74), prior to 
the handover, the parties conducted several metre-by-metre 
inspections of the tunnel, specifically to decide on whether 
any sections required additional support. Professor Broch, 
described the rock as “very good” and “more than good 
enough for a tunnel that is basically designed and built as 
unlined”. The tunnel designers, Pöyry, required “strips of 
shotcrete and mesh” to be placed to cover “certain areas 
of erodible rock”. This action should have dealt with any 
exposed zones of erodible kakirite.
There is one additional, publicly available, photograph 
showing conditions in the HRT. This is reproduced in Fig. 14 
and is apparently a British Geological Survey photograph, 
taken well away from the CFZ. Note that the rock in the tun-
nel walls is intensely folded and faulted and that the tunnel is 
not shotcreted. This is, no doubt, an example of Class 1 rock 
but the chance of predicting failure in this convoluted rock 
mass is slight. There are no numerical modelling methods of 
which I am aware that can deal with such ductile, undulating 
Fig. 13  Q support chart from 
(Norwegian Geotechnical Insti-
tute (NGI) 2015)
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bands and slithers of rock. If the judgement by the tunnel 
engineers or geologists, utilising the Q-system, was that no 
support was required, so be it. There does, however, remain 
an unquantifiable risk that collapse might occur, which could 
only be dealt with by lining the tunnel.
It can be concluded, therefore, that the tunnel had been 
inspected by all parties and found to be stable as far as it is 
possible to state this for an unlined tunnel. The only option 
to limit the risk (from unknown, unknowns) would have 
been, and should have been, a lined tunnel, possibly for the 
full length of the tunnel, an option that was invited at tender 
but presumably rejected as safe but too expensive. The risk 
of collapse, even following joint inspections by qualified 
experienced people, remained for the SSE—not the Contrac-
tor, since the unlined option was chosen (by the Owner) as 
acceptable at the bid and construction stages.
3.10  The Borehole
One strange anomaly is that in the spring of 2008, “Hochtief 
tried to find out more about the CFZ (Conagleann Fault 
Zone)” by drilling a borehole (unknown method) at intake 
15 (Woolman 2016, paragraph 78). One must ask, why was 
that expensive operation carried out, considering that the 
tunnel provided 100% exposure of the rock at a diameter 
of 5 m and had been inspected by numerous professional 
people, and the support requirements had been approved 
on behalf of SSE on 20th September in 2007 (Fig. 7). “The 
attempt was unsuccessful, however, because of adverse 
ground conditions” and the borehole was abandoned 28 m 
above the tunnel crown. This operation, that was surely car-
ried out with the knowledge and approval of SSE, was pre-
sumably to find the CFC and yet was abandoned “because 
of adverse ground conditions”, essentially, just above the 
tunnel. What might an engineering geologist conclude from 
this? He would conclude that the ground conditions above 
the tunnel (in a borehole of diameter 100 mm or so) were 
considerably worse than those inspected in the tunnel.
3.11  Investigation
On 14th August 2009, the first inspection was made follow-
ing the failure and it is evident that the collapse was continu-
ing at that time from the sounds of rock falling (Woolman 
2016, paragraph 106). It is evident that, at the downstream 
end, the collapse comprised large boulders of irregular shape 
that had clearly fallen from the roof (Fig. 12). These blocks 
were not joint bounded but were irregularly shaped, fresh 
(there is one block that has a red–brown discoloured surface) 
and probably from a fault zone, which must be upstream of 
the point where the photo was taken. There are, apparently, 
no detailed reports available on the nature of the collapsed 
zone because the collapse “ceased to be a priority issue once 
SSE elected to construct a bypass tunnel” (Woolman 2016, 
Paragraph 148). There are, however, a few clues. Figure 10 
is a photograph, taken from upstream, showing the tunnel 
completely blocked by comminuted, fine debris. The tun-
nel walls show evidence of folding and faulting. As Smith 
(a geologist from the British Geological Survey, BGS, but 
not, as Lord Woolman (2016) emphasised in paragraph 151, 
an engineering geologist) put it, “If you wanted to build a 
tunnel in the area, you couldn’t have picked a worse spot in 
terms of structural complexity”.
The area is certainly structurally very complex and 
one might expect an adequately trained and experienced 
engineering geologist to get it right, more often than not, 
if the site was “forgiving” rather than “unforgiving”—i.e. 
with inherent and hidden engineering geological problems 
that might be beyond the ability of any professional engi-
neering geologists, to identify (Hencher 2012, page 116). 
Indeed, with a range of experienced inspectors, examining 
the walls of the tunnel, no bells were rung. Each stage of 
rock excavation classification and geological mapping was 
provided to Pöyry and to Jacobs asking: “Please advise if 
the classification or support specification is at variance with 
your observations or design assumptions”; but there was no 
evidence that anyone queried Taylor’s decisions (Woolman 
2016, paragraph 63). Mr. David Fawcett (ex BTS Chairman) 
wrote: “There is no recorded evidence of passing through 
any feature that could potentially cause the catastrophic col-
lapse that has occurred”—but the tunnel failed (Woolman 
2016, paragraph 181).
Mr. Taylor recorded the presence of mica schist kakerite 
on his sheets but as Lord Woolman (2016, paragraph 176) 
stated: “Why go to the trouble of identifying such features 
and then to decide not to do anything about it?” The point 
is that if the kakirite was considered thin and non-erodible, 
one would do exactly as was stated, erect Class II support to 
Fig. 14  Folded and faulted (ductile) ground in the Glendoe high race 
tunnel—well away from the Conagleann Fault Zone (BGS photo)
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the crown. The collapse was, as Dr. Büchi, one of the experts 
put it, a “geological accident” (Woolman 2016, paragraph 
151) but would not one have anticipated such an accident, 
somewhere along the 6.2 km of tunnel in structurally com-
plex rocks, subjected to high water pressures? How long 
would it last—1 year, 2 years, 10 years or 75 years? On 
23rd June, 2008, SSE informed Hochtief that the scheme had 
achieved its availability guarantee of 99% but on 4th August 
a “plume” of sediment was noted issuing and within a year 
the tunnel had collapsed.
If you want and require a low risk tunnel for 75 years, you 
line it and pay for the lining. If you are prepared to accept a 
risk, then you do not. Interestingly, SSE were, apparently, 
prepared to pay for any lining that was advised, during the 
works (Woolman 2016, paragraphs 166 days and e; Glennie 
2018, paragraph 387).
There was no financial advantage to Hochtief to leave 
96% unlined (with localised shotcrete), or to leave any erod-
ible rock exposed; it was a joint decision of what was erod-
ible and what class of support was required, based on the 
expertise of the geologists. If the geologists got it wrong, 
so be it.
3.12  The Experts Views on Lining the Tunnel
At Glendoe, Lord Woolman (2016) summarised at paragraph 
153 that all of the tunnelling experts “agreed that it was 
appropriate (a) to excavate the tunnel by means of a TBM 
(b) to adopt an unlined design concept, and (c) to use the 
observational method of rock classification”. This is a tacit 
acceptance of risk of rock fall by SSE and all the experts 
involved, none of whom argued otherwise.
As previously stated, that opinion is moderated by the 
decision, presumably by SSE, that the 550-m by-pass tun-
nel, post-failure, should be fully lined with 500-mm-thick, 
secondary concrete (Appleyard 2012). That is substantial 
lining, far more than would have been put in if the rock 
had been perceived as Class 4 originally. For the rest of the 
tunnel, a lining of 100 mm has been applied to almost 50% 
of the length (Appleyard, op cit). It is to be noted that there 
remains a risk of rock fall in the other 50% of the tunnel, that 
risk to be accepted, presumably, by SSE.
Geotechnical risk is often larger and may be more cata-
strophic than perceived. As Baecher and Christian (2003) 
summarise it: “People—even experts—rarely assess their 
uncertainty to be as large as it usually turns out to be”. The 
way in which geologists reach decisions, based on their 
previous experience, is addressed by Polson and Curtis 
(2010), showing how original opinions are tempered and 
brought to some consensus (right or wrong). An example 
is discussed by Hencher (1996), concerning Nirex assess-
ments of permeability of the Brockram Rock at Sellafield. 
This case demonstrates how a group of experts, faced 
with a particular set of data, came up with an incorrect 
probability distribution function (‘pdf’), because the data 
set was too small to include high permeability data from 
widely spaced master joints as revealed by a later bore-
hole. All of the original numerical modelling had to be 
rerun.
3.13  The Opinion of Lord Woolman
The basic philosophy of constructing the tunnel needs to be 
borne in mind. The tunnel was to be essentially unlined and 
was to be pressurised periodically over 75 years. During that 
75 years, it was anticipated that blocks of rock would fall 
from the roof. Broch (2000) summarised it:
“As long as rockfalls in certain parts of the tunnel don’t 
occur frequently and increase the head loss, a reason-
able number of small blockages spread out along the 
tunnel will not harm the tunnel or disturb the operation 
of the hydro power station.”
That is a wish, not an engineering solution, but it is what 
SSE bought, in ordering a partially lined tunnel, and agreed 
with, following detailed metre-by-metre inspections by geol-
ogists and engineers.
The SSE assumed risks, except for a defect that existed 
at takeover, which was defined as: “part of the works that 
is not in accordance with the Contractor’s design which has 
been accepted by the Project Manager” (Woolman 2016, 
paragraph, 160). Any defect that was recognised should have 
been notified by the Contractor to the Owner prior to hand-
ing over the tunnel.
In this case, the tunnel apparently conformed to the Con-
tractor’s design as found by the Adjudicator, as referred at 
Sect. 3.7, (a situation that is disputed by Lords Menzies 
and Lord Rennie as discussed below) and, in my view was 
accepted by the PM as per the signed off sections of the tun-
nel classification by Jacobs in the RECs, on behalf of SSE, 
and the statement on 23rd June, 2008 whereby SSE informed 
Hochtief that the scheme had achieved its availability guar-
antee of 99% during the first 6 months period (Woolman 
2016, paragraph 88).
The geological conditions that led to the failure were not 
evident to anyone who examined the tunnel and checked 
the design, which was in accordance with the Contractor’s 
design and, in accordance with Option M, which states that:
“The Contractor is not liable for Defects in the works 
due to his design so far as he proves that he used rea-
sonable skill and care to ensure that it complied with 
the Works information.” (Woolman 2016, paragraph 
162).
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The non-evident nature of the ‘defect’ is apparent; other-
wise, the tunnel would not have been ‘accepted’.
The Contractor evidently exercised reasonable skill and 
care as was explained by Lord Woolman:
“Many experienced tunnellers scrutinised the HRT 
both during and after the TBM drive. They included 
engineering geologists, tunnel designers, engineers 
and the TBM crew; they were actively looking for 
problems. None of them saw any signs of faults that 
might threaten tunnel stability. None recommended the 
installation of a higher level of support at particular 
locations.” (Lord Woolman, 2016, paragraph 180).
Lord Woolman concluded (at paragraph 187):
“I am satisfied that Hochtief did exercise reasonable 
skill and care.”
In my opinion, the structure that failed was much larger 
and beyond the ability of observation by any of the experts 
who subsequently examined the tunnel mapping. Perhaps, 
in hindsight, the tunnel should have been lined, arbitrarily, 
through the fault zone especially and, depending on the risk 
that SSE was going to accept, perhaps for the whole tunnel.
Lord Woolman (2016) concludes (at paragraph 194) that: 
“I therefore hold that there was no contributory negligence 
on the part of SSE in failing to appreciate the significance 
of the odd readings.” That decision is questionable, given 
the publication on previous tunnel collapses in unlined tun-
nels by Sandilands, presumably the PM for Glendoe (Cam-
eron and Sandilands 1996). The fact that Sandilands had 
experience of numerous rock falls from tunnels in Scotland, 
should, it might be argued, have made him more aware of 
the risk of failure (that he apparently disregarded for several 
months).
In his conclusions, Lord Woolman states (at paragraph 
260, e.) that “The collapse was not due to a defect that 
existed at takeover. Accordingly, it was an employer’s risk 
event”. The geological conditions that caused the failure 
clearly did exist at handover but the hazard (one that would 
deteriorate with time) remained an ‘employer’s risk event’ in 
that it was one that was not identified as a ‘defect’ in design 
or in implementation of the design, using reasonable skill 
and care by all parties.
3.14  The Appeal
The Appeal was heard in 2018 by three judges: The Lord 
President (Lord Carloway), Lord Menzies and Lord Glen-
nie. Lord Carloway found for the Contractor, Hochtief (in 
agreement with the Lord Woolman). Lord Menzies and Lord 
Glennie found for the ‘Pursuer’—SSE.
Lord Menzies examines two ‘limbs’ to the case (Menzies 
2018, paragraph 339). The first is regarding time. He argues 
that a tunnel that was supposed to last for 75 years, that col-
lapsed before the ‘Defects date’, after 4 years, could not be 
fit for purpose. This argument does not persuade me, as the 
75 years, which everyone who examined the tunnel agreed 
that the tunnel should have lasted, was an Objective not a 
Requirement (Lord Menzies 2018, paragraph 342). Why 
the Defects date is relevant is not explained; what would 
have been the situation if the collapse had occurred after 
the ‘Defect Period’?
The second point concerns Table 11 (Table 3 is a sim-
plified version) (paragraph 345). It is argued that because 
kakirite (kakerite) was recorded in Taylor’s sheet that it 
should have led to shotcrete cover. Lord Menzies (2018) 
makes the statement at paragraph 346: “As your Lordship in 
the chair observes (at para [259]), it may be assumed from 
the commercial judge’s findings that some erodible rock had 
not been shotcreted”. This is incorrect. ‘Kakerite’ is not the 
same as ‘erodible kakirite’. There could well be seams of 
fault breccia that were regarded as non-erodible identified 
on Taylor’s sheet (Fig. 8) but not large enough to be depicted 
in the map of the tunnel over the same chainages. He wrote: 
“Some shear zones with QMS kakerite, local slab forma-
tion and blockfall in side walls. Rotate CII support to LHS 
from 2117 to 2107. Extend shotcrete to maximum extent 
in shotcrete bay and backfill voids” on the relevant REC, 
reproduced here as Fig. 7. As far as I am concerned, this was 
(a) recognising the localised problem and (b) dealing with it.
In paragraph 349, Lord Menzies (2018) expresses his 
opinion that the design was never accepted by the Project 
Manager for the purpose of clause 21.2, “Although Mr 
Sandilands may have indicated his informal approval, this 
could not amount to formal acceptance for this purpose.” 
This raises the question of at what stage was the design 
accepted and by whom? It is clear that the REC for chain-
ages 2101–2117, reproduced in Appendix 5 of Lord Carlo-
way’s opinion (Carloway 2018), was signed as “Approved 
(for SSE)” (see Fig. 7). On 18th December 2008, the tun-
nels and power station were taken over by the Employer as 
“sufficiently complete for safe operation” (Woolman 2016, 
paragraph 79). In my view this means that the design, with 
its risk, was accepted by the Owner.
Lord Menzies (2018) considers the failure, accept-
ing Lord Woolman’s view of the importance of ‘erodible 
rock’. He points out the importance of ‘erodible rock’ in 
Table 3 which constituted part of the design. The remedy for 
‘erodible rock’ was “application of shotcrete if not already 
covered/“protected” by steel rib support”. Class IV support 
was the only remedy involving steel sets and was not in fact 
used anywhere in the tunnels.
This view of the cause of the failure conflicts with Lord 
Woolman’s astute observation of “why go to the trouble 
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of identifying such features and then decide to do nothing 
about them?” (Woolman 2016, paragraph 176). This was 
not ‘painting by numbers’—it was judgement of engineering 
geological risk, checked and approved by other professional 
and highly experienced engineering geologists such as Derek 
Williams (of Jacobs).
In my opinion, an alternative explanation to the ‘ero-
sion theory’ is that the rock collapsed as a series of 
wedges with structural geological control. Downstream, 
the wedges were generally large, involving blocks of rock 
of 1 m or greater (see Fig. 11). The upstream part of the 
failure may have involved collapse of fragments of rock 
released by incipient discontinuities, resulting in the com-
minuted pile of fine debris as seen in Fig. 9.
Lord Menzies considers the design life of 75 years, 
but as noted earlier, the experts and engineering geolo-
gists had this in mind when handing over the tunnel. That 
was their judgement, but which proved incorrect. If SSE 
wanted a tunnel with no risk of collapse, then they should 
have instructed a fully lined tunnel, especially considering 
their earlier experience with unlined tunnels (Cameron and 
Sandilands 1996).
Lord Glennie (Glennie 2018, paragraph 364–367) con-
siders the term defect and finds that there was no defect 
in design. “The Defect” (causing the collapse) “was not 
one of design but rather implementation of that design” 
(paragraph 375). He argues that the REC (Tables 1, 2) was 
not complied with, with all sections of “erosion of erodible 
rock during operation” covered with shotcrete and that it 
follows that the implementation of design was incorrect.
He misses the point completely that kakerite (sic) was 
noted on the REC but not ‘erodible kakerite’. No such 
material was logged on the Geological Fold Out Mapping 
Sheet in Fig. 8. Lord Glennie assumes that the REC exhib-
ited in Table 1 is complete and fool-proof as a design tool. 
That is incorrect. What, one might ask, should the engi-
neering geologist have done about the weak rock exposed 
in the side walls, with polished surfaces? It says nothing 
about such rock in the REC, which it must be argued, was 
there as a design aide, to assist the engineering geologist 
in his decisions at the tunnel face. The design decision 
was taken by the engineering geologist, and then checked 
by various parties, to ensure that the tunnel was adequate 
and would (should) remain so for 75 years. During that 
design life, the normal actions of water hammer and surges 
would be anticipated, which can create positive and nega-
tive water pressures periodically in the tunnel walls. The 
fact that it did not last the full 75 years is a consequence 
of how much risk the Owner was prepared to take and the 
unforeseen ground conditions, despite 100% exposure in 
the tunnel walls.
In other words, I believe that the opinions of Lords Glen-
nie and Menzies (2018) are questionable, based on legalistic 
interpretations of Table 1, that any hard-rock tunneller would 
find surprising. It exposes the difficulties in approaching 
geotechnical and geological matters as if they were points 
of law and highlights the advantages of an arbitration sys-
tem, run by one or three professionals, appointed as agreed 
by the parties.
4  Discussion
Geotechnical risk is always difficult to address as ground 
and environmental factors can be very complex, leading 
to geological conditions that are rare or even completely 
new to the engineer. For example, a slope in Brisbane, that 
was originally designed on the basis of a few boreholes 
and trial pits as is standard, took more than 4 years of sub-
sequent effort by teams of professionals including geolo-
gists and geophysicists and more than 5 km of additional 
drilling and other ground investigation, before the decision 
was taken to remove the top of the hill that was driving the 
failure (Wentzinger et al. 2013). Another example is the 
Ping Lin Tunnel, in Taiwan in which two 11.84 m TBMs 
had to be abandoned and the tunnelling method changed 
to drill and blast due to unexpectedly high water inflow. 
The tunnel took several additional years to complete and 
considerable loss of life (Barla and Pelizza 2000).
At Glendoe, all the tunnelling experts agreed that an 
‘unlined’ tunnel solution was acceptable (Woolman 2016, 
paragraph 153), leaving a major risk of tunnel collapse, 
as occurred. The lifetime of the tunnel of 75 years, made 
much of by the Appeal judges, was an Owners Objective 
not a commitment by the tunnel designers. To quote Lord 
Woolman (2016, paragraph 163 and 164):
“Hochtief did not guarantee the works. Instead it 
accepted the familiar and lesser obligation of ‘rea-
sonable skill and care’. and,
“If SSE’s interpretation was correct, it would mean 
that Hochtief had an overarching obligation to pro-
vide tunnels suitable for their purpose. … It would 
effectively rob Option M of its meaning.”
The level of support that was decided on by David Tay-
lor of Hochtief was approved by Derek Williams of Jacobs 
on behalf of SSE. In my view, the engineering geologist, 
Taylor and all the others that examined the tunnel, were 
not negligent. They simply did not recognise the nature 
and scale of the problem that arose in the CFZ, that was 
much larger than the ‘aide memoire’ Mapping Sheets, with 
the void extending more than 100 m away from the tunnel. 
The fact that the tunnel collapsed over such a large length 
is evidence that the support system was not, in the event, 
adequate, even though it had been judged as sufficient, 
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within the tunnel, at the time of handover, by all parties. In 
hindsight, the only way of preventing collapse would have 
been to use water-proof lining, probably 500 mm thick for 
the full fault zone, as was adopted in the by-pass tunnel 
following the collapse. Even that measure, combined with 
lining more than 3 km of the tunnel with shotcrete, which 
has been conducted retrospectively, is no guarantee that 
the tunnel will remain open for 75 years. There remains a 
geotechnical risk that, it is presumed, still must be borne 
by the Owner, SSE.
5  Conclusions
The case of responsibility for the Glendoe tunnel collapse 
was first adjudicated then subjected to a court case over an 
“action of damages” that was later appealed (Carloway 2018, 
paragraph 1). As a result, the case has been overturned in 
favour of the “Pursuer” on the basis of technical and contrac-
tual grounds that are not proved in my opinion. The case is 
now scheduled to be heard in the Supreme Court.
Regarding the technical causes of the collapse, this paper 
highlights some of the geotechnical findings that were not 
accounted for in the judgement.
In particular ‘kakerite’ or kakirite was wrongly assumed 
by all the judges to be inherently erodible. In my opinion, 
given the choice of descriptors between ‘kakerite’ and 
mylonite for fault rocks, in Class II of the REC sheet, the 
term ‘non-erodible’ was used to define non-erodible kakir-
ite—such as cemented fault gouge.
That being so, in the absence of erodible rock, there is no 
need to assume that Class III or Class IV should have been 
automatically applied.
The opinion of Lord Woolman (2016) regarding cause 
that “(2) The weak rock deteriorated and lost its strength 
when submerged, a process Professor Stille referred to as 
‘slaking’. (3) The flowing water washed out areas of erodible 
rock”, whilst possible, is not supported by evidence. Profes-
sor Broch searched the tunnel for swelling minerals and the 
tests conducted showed none.
In my opinion, an alternative and more likely explana-
tion is that the failure was largely due to a complex and very 
large wedge failure. There are two adverse joint measure-
ments in Fig. 8 and the rating of the rock mass was ‘3 + r’ 
(meaning three sets plus random joints). In my view such 
large-scale wedge failure is far more likely an explanation 
for the faulted structure which ravelled away from the tunnel 
by up to 172 m. It is likely that this was compounded by the 
presence of ‘fresh moderately weak’ rock in the tunnel. That 
this rock was described as ‘fresh’ means that it must have 
been disintegrated presumably by tectonic action, rather than 
decomposed.
Contractually, there is the question of whether or not, and 
when the tunnel was ‘accepted’ by SSE. There seem to be 
four factors:
1. The tunnel was to be ‘design and build’. SSE accepted 
that the tunnel would have a thin lining for less than 1% 
of its length, whereas, their consulting engineer, Jacobs, 
had predicted 100% lining for a drill and blast tunnel. 
I remain unconvinced that forming a tunnel by TBM 
would really reduce the risk to that extent but I agree 
with Professor Grøv that geological details might be 
difficult to make out in a TBM tunnel with ‘rifle bore’ 
finish.
2. As the tunnel was constructed, RECs were submitted to 
the supervising engineer, to check (using the Q-system). 
There was no disagreement over the classes of support 
that were defined. The RECs were formally ‘approved’ 
by the checking engineer on behalf of SSE.
3. There was to be a defects period of 2 years after com-
pletion. It is stated, however, that the Contractor was, 
apparently as a generality (Carloway 2018, paragraph 
11):
 “not liable for defects in the works due to his 
design so far as he proves that he used reasonable 
skill and care to ensure that it complied with the 
works information.”
  It seems evident that, by the inspections by all par-
ties of the tunnel walls on a metre-by-metre basis, that 
reasonable skill and care was taken.
4. On 23rd June 2009 Hochtief were informed that the 
scheme had achieved its availability guarantee of 99% 
during the first 6 months period. (Woolman paragraph 
88).
It is my opinion that the tunnel was accepted by SSE 
from Hochtief and that the risks from tunnel collapse, in 
the essentially unlined tunnel, were then taken on by SSE.
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